

# Lecture Notes on Conservation Management

or:

## Robustness, Expected Utility and the Sumatran Rhinoceros

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**A Note to the Student:** These lecture notes are not a substitute for the thorough study of books. These notes are no more than an aid in following the lectures.

## Contents

1	The Generic Problem	2
2	The Problem: Endangered Species	3
3	Expected Utility	4
4	Uncertainties	5
5	Robustness	6
6	Example	7

# 1 The Generic Problem

## ¶ Engineering design:

- Uncertain operating conditions of device.
- Various design alternatives.
- Uncertain performance for each alternative.

What to do?

## ¶ Business strategy:

- Uncertain plans of competitive firms.
- Various development alternatives for your firm.
- Uncertain outcome for each alternative.

What to do?

## ¶ Military field tactics:

- Uncertain enemy strength and deployment.
- Various available actions.
- Uncertain outcome for each action.

What to do?

## ¶ Generic problem:

- States of the world with uncertain probabilities  $p_1, p_2 \dots$
- Available actions  $a_1, a_2 \dots$
- Uncertain utility  $v_{ij}$  of action  $i$  given state  $j$ .

What to do?

## 2 The Problem: Endangered Species

¶ The Sumatran rhinoceros is an endangered species. There are only a fairly small number of reproducing breeding pairs. We must choose a strategy which will enhance the probability of survival of the species.

¶ We will first develop the approach of **expected utility**.

¶ We will then embed the expected utility analysis in an **info-gap robust-satisficing** approach.

¶ We will deal with three basic entities:

1. **States of the world**, where  $p_j$  = probability that the world is in state  $j$ .

The states of the world refer to the alternative possible causes of decline and disappearance of the Sumatran rhinoceros:

- (a) Poaching.
- (b) Loss of habitat.
- (c) Demographic accidents.
- (d) Disease.

2. **Actions**, denoted  $a_1, a_2, \dots$ , which can be adopted to protect the rhino. These include:

- (a) Translocation of the rhino population to a new region.
- (b) Extension of the current reserve in which the rhinos live.
- (c) Captive breeding.

3. **Utilities**,  $v_{ij}$  of action  $a_i$  if the world is in state  $j$ . In our example, the utility  $v_{ij}$  will be the probability of survival of the species (for a specified duration, like a season or a decade), given that action  $a_i$  is taken when the world is in state  $j$ . Thus  $v_{ij}$  is a conditional probability. (Note that  $v_{ij}$  is not a normalized probability distribution. It may be, for instance, that the probability of survival is very low for all states of the world.)

### 3 Expected Utility

¶ The **expected utility** of action  $a_i$  is the average utility of that action:

$$E(a_i) = \sum_j v_{ij}p_j \quad (1)$$

Since  $v_{ij}$  is the probability of survival given action  $a_i$  in state  $j$ , we see that  $E(a_i)$  is the probability of survival averaged over all states of the world, if action  $a_i$  is taken.

¶ The **optimal action**,  $a^*$ , from the perspective of expected utility theory, is the action which maximizes the average utility:

$$a^* = \arg \max_{a_i} E(a_i) \quad (2)$$

$$= \arg \max_{a_i} \sum_j v_{ij}p_j \quad (3)$$

$a^*$  is the action which, on average, has the highest utility (greatest probability of survival), based on the values of  $v_{ij}$  and  $p_j$  in eq.(3).

## 4 Uncertainties

¶ The expected utility approach is designed to deal with:

— Uncertainty in the state of the world. Hence, the terms  $p_j$ .

— Uncertainty in the survival resulting from action  $a_i$  in state  $j$ , hence the utilities  $v_{ij}$  which are conditional probabilities.

¶ However, these probabilities,  $p_j$  and  $v_{ij}$ , are themselves very imprecisely known. There are large **info-gaps** between the best estimates and the true values of these quantities.

¶ We will represent the uncertainties in  $p_j$  and  $v_{ij}$  by info-gap models  $\mathcal{P}(h, \tilde{p})$  and  $\mathcal{V}(h, \tilde{v})$ , respectively:

$$\mathcal{P}(h, \tilde{p}) = \left\{ p : \sum_j p_j = 1. \max[0, (1-h)\tilde{p}_j] \leq p_j \leq \min[1, (1+h)\tilde{p}_j], j = 1, 2, \dots \right\},$$

$$h \geq 0 \quad (4)$$

$$\mathcal{V}(h, \tilde{v}) = \{v : \max[0, (1-h)\tilde{v}_{ij}] \leq v_{ij} \leq \min[1, (1+h)\tilde{v}_{ij}], i = 1, 2, \dots, j = 1, 2, \dots\},$$

$$h \geq 0 \quad (5)$$

These are interval-bound info-gap models, adapted to the specific case of probabilities. In particular:

1. Since  $p_j$  and  $v_{ij}$  are probabilities, they must lie in the interval  $[0, 1]$ .
2. The probability distribution  $p_j$  is normalized on  $j$ .
3. The probability distribution  $v_{ij}$  is not normalized on  $j$ :

It could be that  $\sum_j v_{ij} \leq 1$ , which occurs if all the survival probabilities are very small.

It could be that  $\sum_j v_{ij} \geq 1$ , which occurs if all the survival probabilities are very large.

## 5 Robustness

¶ Given estimates  $\tilde{p}$  and  $\tilde{v}$  of the probabilities, we can estimate the expected utility of any action  $a_i$ ,  $E(a_i, \tilde{p}, \tilde{v})$ .

¶ For any other choice of the probabilities,  $p$  and  $v$ , the expected utility is  $E(a_i, p, v)$ .

¶ Since these estimates,  $\tilde{p}$  and  $\tilde{v}$ , are very uncertain, we do not have confidence that the actual utility which is expected to result from action  $a_i$  equals  $E(a_i, \tilde{p}, \tilde{v})$ .

That is, we have every reason to believe that, for many choices of  $p$  and  $v$ , and especially for the true choice:

$$E(a_i, p, v) \neq E(a_i, \tilde{p}, \tilde{v}) \quad (6)$$

¶ Let  $E_c$  be the lowest level of expected utility (least average probability of survival of the species) which we are willing to accept.

¶ The robustness of action  $a_i$ , to uncertainties in the probabilities  $p_j$  and  $v_{ij}$ , is the greatest horizon of uncertainty  $h$  up to which adequate expected utility,  $E_c$ , is obtained for any realization of the probabilities:

$$\hat{h}(a_i, E_c) = \max \left\{ h : \left( \min_{\substack{p \in \mathcal{P}(h, \tilde{p}) \\ v \in \mathcal{V}(h, \tilde{v})}} \sum_j v_{ij} p_j \right) \geq E_c \right\} \quad (7)$$

¶ The robust optimal action,  $\hat{a}(E_c)$ , maximizes the robustness and satisfies the expected utility at the value  $E_c$ :

$$\hat{a}(E_c) = \arg \max_{a_i} \hat{h}(a_i, E_c) \quad (8)$$

¶ The robust-optimal action,  $\hat{a}(E_c)$ , depends on the aspiration for survival,  $E_c$ .

¶ The robust-optimal action,  $\hat{a}(E_c)$ , is very likely to be different from  $a^*$ , the action which maximizes the best-estimate of the expected utility.

## 6 Example

State (Cause of decline)	Probability $p_j$ of that state	Cond. Prob. $v_{1j}$ (Translocation) $(a_1)$	Cond. Prob. $v_{2j}$ (New reserve) $(a_2)$	Cond. Prob. $v_{3j}$ (Captive breeding) $(a_3)$
Poaching	0.1	0.3	0.25	0.9
Loss of habitat	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.2
Demographic accidents	0.5	0.05	0.09	0.01
Disease	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4
Expected utility		$\sum_j v_{1j}p_j = 0.095$	$\sum_j v_{2j}p_j = 0.14$	$\sum_j v_{3j}p_j = 0.195$

Table 1: Estimated probabilities.

¶ From table 1 we see that action  $a_3$ , captive breeding, has the greatest expected utility. The EU approach therefore recommends action  $a_3$ . This is in fact the conservation strategy which has been recommended by conservation biologists who have studied the sumatran rhinoceros problem.

¶ However, we know that the robustness of maximal expectations is zero! That is:

$$0 = \hat{h}(a_1, 0.095) = \hat{h}(a_2, 0.14) = \hat{h}(a_3, 0.195) \quad (9)$$

That is, action  $a_1$  cannot be relied upon to result, on the average, in utility 0.095.

Likewise, action  $a_2$  cannot be relied upon to result, on the average, in utility 0.14.

Likewise, action  $a_3$  cannot be relied upon to result, on the average, in utility 0.195.

Infinitesimal errors in  $p$  or  $v$  may result in either better, or worse, average probability of survival.

¶ How much performance (probability of survival) must be foregone in order to obtain a reliable probability of survival?




Figure 1: Robustness curves for actions 1 ( $\circ$ ), 2 ( $\diamond$ ) and 3 ( $\star$ ).

¶ From the figure we note:

1. The trade-off between performance (demanded expected utility  $E_c$ ) and robustness to uncertainty.
2. The nominal optimal action, according to expected-utility theory,  $a^* = a_3$  (captive breeding), has zero robustness.
3. In fact the robustnesses of all the nominal expected utilities are zero.
4. Reversal of preference:
  - (a) For  $E_c > 0.12$ , the most robust action is captive breeding ( $a_3$ ).
  - (b) For  $E_c < 0.12$ , the most robust action is extension of the current reserve ( $a_2$ ).
  - (c) For  $E_c < 0.04$  there is a preference reversal between  $a_1$  and  $a_3$ , but  $a_2$  is still the option of choice.

In other words, the robust-optimal choice of an action depends on the performance which is required.